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Abstract An argument that makes use of a generalization activates the prototype for
the category used in the generalization. We conducted two experiments that investi-
gated how the activation of the prototype affects the persuasiveness of the argument.
The results of the experiments suggest that the features of the prototype overshadow
and partly overwrite the actual facts of the case. The case is, to some extent, judged as if
it had the features of the prototype instead of the features it actually has. This prototype
effect increases the persuasiveness of the argument in situations where the audience
finds the judgment more warranted for the prototype than for the actual case (positive
prototype effect), but decreases persuasiveness in situations where the audience finds
the judgment less warranted for the prototype than for the actual case (negative
prototype effect).
1 Introduction
This study is concerned with arguments that make use of a generalization to make a
judgment in a specific case. As an example, imagine a criminal trial where a 7-year-old
girl testifies as a witness for the prosecution and the defense attorney questions her
reliability with the argument that Ba child is less reliable as a witness^. We are
interested in the persuasiveness of such generalizations, and investigate how persua-
siveness is related to prototype effects.
A generalization claims that cases belonging to a certain category (e.g. Bchild^) have
a certain property (e.g. Bless reliable as a witness^). According to prototype theory
some of the cases that belong to a certain category are more typical members of that
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2000). A 7-year-old is, for example, a more typical member of the category Bchild^
than a 14-year-old. In prototype theory, the most typical member of a category is
referred to as the prototype of the category in question. It should be pointed out that a
prototype is an abstract entity, not an actual case. The Bchild^ prototype is not an actual
child, but an imaginary child with all the features that are typically associated with
children (youth, playfulness, lack of responsibility etc). A prototype is a mental
representation that serves as a cognitive reference point for the category. The most
salient features of the prototype are the first features that come to mind when the
category is mentioned. The effects that prototypes have on categorization are referred to
as prototype effects. That the response time for categorization is shorter for cases that fit
the prototype is an example of a prototype effect (Lakoff 1987).
Previous studies on prototypes show that subjects are more likely to apply a
generalization to a case if the case fits the prototype for the category used in the
generalization (Inman and Baron 1996; Inman et al. 1998; Krumm and Corning 2008).
Our study is concerned with situations where a generalization is used in argumentation
to make an audience agree with a certain judgment, and we investigate to what extent
the agreement is influenced by prototype effects. Some cases fit a prototype better than
other cases, and we examine to what extent such differences have an effect on the
persuasiveness of the generalization.
2 Positive and Negative Prototype Effects
An argument that makes use of a generalization claims that cases belonging to a certain
category have a certain property (e.g. Ba child is less reliable as a witness^), and applies
this generalization to a specific case. If we look at cases where a certain generalization
is applied, an audience will find the judgment more warranted in some cases than
others (Toulmin 1958). When it comes to child witnesses, an audience will, for
example, find the judgment that X is less reliable because X is a child, more warranted
in a case where X is 6 years old than in a case where X is 8 years old (Ross et al. 1989,
1990). The warrantedness of a judgment can be assessed in a relation to the prototype
of the category in question. Suppose, for example, that the Bprototype child^ is 7 years
old. That would mean that the judgment that X is Bless reliable as witness^ is more
warranted than the judgment that the Bprototype child^ is Bless reliable as a witness^ if
X is under 7 years old, and less warranted if X is older than seven. The question is how
this affects the persuasiveness of an argument that uses a generalization.
The activation of the prototype has the potential to overshadow the rest of the
category, so that all members of the category are perceived to have the features of the
prototype (Lakoff 1987, 85). This kind of prototype effect has been described in an
article by Steven Winter as a Bradical prototype effect^ (Winter 1988, 1386), and in
later works byWinter as an Bassimilation-to-prototype-effect^ (Winter 2001, 150–151).
When the features of a prototype overshadow the actual facts of the case, the case will
be judged as if it had the features of the prototype rather than the features it actually has.
As an example, if the prototype child is 7 years old, an argument where the category
Bchild^ is applied to a 12-year-old would be judged as if the 12-year-old was a 7-year-
old. This would make an audience agree more with the judgment, since the audience
would find the argument that a 7-year-old is less reliable as a witness more warranted
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than the argument that a 12-year-old is less reliable. In the following, we will refer to
such an effect as a positive prototype effect. In the opposite situation where the audience
finds the judgment less warranted for the prototype than the actual case, a prototype that
overshadows the actual facts of the case will make the audience agree less with the
judgment. We will refer to this kind of effect as a negative prototype effect. The
application of the category Bchild^ to a 5-year-old could, for example, activate the
prototypical 7-year-old child, to the effect that the 5-year-old is judged as if it was a 7-
year-old. As a general theory, this connection between prototype effect and persuasive-
ness can be summarized as follows: If the audience finds the judgment more warranted
for the prototype than for the actual case, the generalization will make the audience
agree more with the judgment (positive prototype effect). If the audience finds the
judgment equally warranted for the prototype and the actual case, the generalization
will have no effect on the audience’s agreement with the judgment. If the audience finds
the judgment less warranted for the prototype than for the actual case, the generaliza-
tion will make the audience agree less with the judgment (negative prototype effect).
One thing should be added to this theory. If we look at cases where the judgment that
the Bprototype child^ is less reliable as a witness is more warranted than the judgment
that X is less reliable as witness, we quickly realize that they not only include cases
where X is 12 years old, but also cases where X is 14, 17, 19, 25, and so on. In other
words, they include cases where the audience will find it inappropriate to categorize X
as a Bchild^. In situations where a category is used inappropriately there should be no
(positive) prototype effect. On the contrary, there is reason to suspect that the audience
will react negatively to the inappropriate use of the category and agree less with the
judgment. In the following, we will refer to this kind of negative reaction as a category
transgression effect.
To test if there is a positive and negative prototype effect as described above we
conducted two experiments where the participants were presented with court room
scenarios and asked to what extent they agreed with an argument that made use of the
generalization. The first experiment tested the generalization Ba child is less reliable as
a witness^ and the second experiment tested the generalization Ba person who is
intoxicated with alcohol is less reliable as a witness^. In each experiment the results
were compared with a control group where the participants were presented with the
same scenario and the same argument without the generalization.
3 Experiment 1—BChild^
3.1 Participants
Data was collected online using Amazon Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com/),
an online service that recruits participants to carry out online tasks, such as surveys or
experimental tasks. Amazon Mechanical Turk has an increasing popularity among
social scientists as a source of data (Paolacci et al. 2010). A benefit of Amazon
Mechanical Turk over traditional data collection methods is that it becomes feasible
to run studies with large numbers of participants. Another benefit is that, compared to
experiments where the participants consist of university students, participants on
Amazon Mechanical Turk are more demographically diverse (Buhrmester et al. 2011;
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Ipeirotis 2010). The participants received $0.45 to complete the test. All participants
were US residents. In total, 1187 participants took the test, but 45 participants were
removed from the data set because they completed the test either in a very short time
(less than 100 s was used as the exclusion criteria) or left the test incomplete. Left for
the analysis were 1142 participants (577 women) with a mean age of 32 years (SD=11.
8).
3.2 Design
A 6×2 fully factorial design was used. The first factor was the age of the witness in the
court room scenario (4, 9, 12, 14, 17 or 19 years old). The second factor was the version
of the argument made by the defense attorney (child generalization version and control
version).
3.3 Material
The experiment was based on a court room scenario with six versions. The six
versions were identical, except for the age of the witness, Jessica Miller. Each
participant was presented with one of the six versions. The court room scenario read
as follows:
BJason Williams is standing trial for murder. According to the prosecutor, Wil-
liams stabbed a man to death in front of a movie theatre in Atlanta, Georgia, on
July 10, 2011. At the trial, the prosecution calls Jessica Miller as a witness. She is
X and lives across the street from the movie theatre. She testifies that she saw the
murder from her house, and identifies Williams as the killer.^
Scenario 1 X = B4 years old^
Scenario 2 X = B9 years old^
Scenario 3 X = B12 years old^
Scenario 4 X = B14 years old^
Scenario 5 X = B17 years old^
Scenario 6 X = B19 years old^
Then, the participants were presented with an argument from the defense
attorney. Each scenario had two versions of the defense attorney’s argument,
one version (child generalization) where the argument is based on the generaliza-
tion Ba child is less reliable as witness^, and one version (control) that does not
use this generalization. In the control version, the word Bchild^ is removed, and
substituted with the age of Jessica Miller according to the scenario. Each partic-
ipant was either given the child generalization version or the control version of the
argument.
child generalization BI would like to draw your attention to one important circum-
stance regarding Jessica Miller. A child is less reliable as a
witness. Jessica Miller is therefore less reliable as a witness.^
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control BI would like to draw your attention to one important circum-
stance regarding Jessica Miller. A X is less reliable as a witness.
Jessica Miller is therefore less reliable as a witness.^
Scenario 1 X = B4-year-old^
Scenario 2 X = B9-year-old^
Scenario 3 X = B12-year-old^
Scenario 4 X = B14-year-old^
Scenario 5 X = B17-year-old^
Scenario 6 X = B19-year-old^
3.4 Procedure
After reading the given scenario and the given version of the argument the participants
were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the argument on a scale from one
(‘strongly disagree’) to nine (‘strongly agree’).
3.5 Hypotheses
The purpose of the experiment was to investigate the difference in agreement with the
argument in the child generalization version and the control version, over the six
scenarios with the different ages of Jessica Miller. On the basis of the general theory
outlined in Section 2 above our hypotheses for the experiment were as follows.
The participants will find the use of the category Bchild^ appropriate if it is applied
to a person whose age lies within the boundaries of their conception of Bchild^, and the
participants will find the use inappropriate if it is applied to a person who is too old to
be categorized as a child. This means that a division can be made between appropriate
uses, where the age of Jessica Miller is below the boundary age, and inappropriate uses
where her age is above the boundary age. We predicted that the participants would react
negatively to inappropriate uses, and we therefore predicted that the participants would
agree less with the argument in the child generalization version than the control version
above the boundary age (category transgression effect).
For cases that fall below the boundary age a division can be made between cases
where Jessica Miller is older than the prototype child and cases where she is younger
than the prototype child. In cases where the age of Jessica Miller is higher than the
prototypical age we expected the participants to agree more with the child generaliza-
tion version than the control version (positive prototype effect). In cases where the age
of Jessica Miller is lower than the prototypical age we expected the participants to agree
less with the child generalization version than the control version (negative prototype
effect).
These hypotheses are conceptually displayed in Fig. 1, where the participant’s
agreement with the argument is plotted against the age of Jessica Miller. In the control
version, where the argument simply refers to Jessica Miller’s age, agreement declines
monotonically with age (dotted line). In the child generalization version (straight line),
agreement moves towards the degree of agreement at the prototypical age. And when
the age of Jessica Miller passes the boundary age, agreement with child generalization
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version plummets sharply. It should be noted that the figure is idealized, and, in the real
data, we would expect the boundary and the prototype to be fuzzy.
We assumed the prototypical age of a child to be around 7 years, and the boundary
age to be around 15 years. On the basis of these assumptions we made the following
predictions for the six scenarios. In Scenario 1 (4 years old) we predicted that the
participants would agree less with the argument in the child generalization version than
the control version (negative prototype effect). In Scenario 2 (9 years old), Scenario 3
(12 years old) and Scenario 4 (14 years old) we predicted that the participants would
agree more with the argument in the child generalization version than the control
version (positive prototype effect). In Scenario 5 (17 years old) and Scenario 6 (19 years
old) we predicted that the participants would agree less with argument in the child
generalization version than the control version (category transgression effect).
3.6 Results
The results of the experiment are summarized in Table 1. To analyze the difference in
agreement between the child generalization version of the argument and the control
version, a t-test was conducted for each age.
In Scenario 1 (4 years old) participants agreed less with the argument in the child
generalization version than the control version, as predicted (negative prototype effect).
In Scenario 2 (9 years old), Scenario 3 (12 years old) and Scenario 4 (14 years old)
participants agreed more with the child generalization version than the control version,
as predicted (positive prototype effect). In Scenario 5 (17 years old) participants agreed
equally with the argument in the child generalization version and the control version.
This was not predicted. In Scenario 6 (19 years old) participants agreed less with the
Fig. 1 The mean agreement with the argument as a function of the age of the witness and argument version
(hypotheses)
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argument in the child generalization version than the control version, as predicted. As
Table 1 shows the results were statistically significant in Scenario 3 (12 years old),
Scenario 4 (14 years old) and Scenario 6 (19 years old).
A graphic representation of the results is presented in Fig. 2. As we can see, Fig. 2
resembles the hypotheses depicted in Fig. 1.
The relation between the agreement rating and the age of the witness seems to be
well captured by a quadratic function where the prototype effect is manifested as a
difference in curvature between the curves for the two argument versions. A quadratic
function that includes an interaction between the curvature of the relationship between
the agreement rating and the age of the witness is also the most parsimonious model
able to capture the hypothesized relationship shown in Fig. 1.
Linear regression modeling was used to test if there was a difference in curvature
and, subsequently, a region with a positive prototype effect. Three models of increasing
complexity were fitted to the data with the agreement rating as the response variable: A
Table 1 Means (and SDs), t-values, and corresponding Cohen’s d for agreement with the child generalization
version and control version of the argument, for different ages of the witness
Age of witness Child generalization Control t Cohen’s d
N Mean and SD N Mean and SD
4 years 89 5.31 (2.51) 95 5.84 (2.34) −1.47 −.22
9 years 80 4.38 (2.21) 93 3.99 (2.22) 1.14 .18
12 years 89 3.98 (2.38) 96 3.13 (1.95) 2.67** .39
14 years 95 2.92 (1.95) 99 2.37 (1.57) 2.13* .31
17 years 94 2.21 (1.71) 99 2.16 (1.60) .22 .03
19 years 108 1.59 (1.11) 105 2.12 (1.99) −2.41* −.25
*p<.05, **p<.01
Fig. 2 The mean agreement with the argument as a function of the age of the witness and argument version.
The dashed grey lines show the best fitting quadratic curves
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first model (M0) that included only an intercept term. A second model (M1) that also
included the age of the witness as an explanatory variable (xage). A third model (M2)
that included both the age of the witness and the argument version (xarg) as explanatory
variables and that accounted for the difference in curvature between the two versions of
the argument. These three models are summarized below:
M0 : β0 þ ε
M1 : β0 þ β1xage þ ε
M2 : β0 þ β1xage þ β2x2age þ β3xarg þ β4xagexarg þ β5x2agexarg þ ε
ε∼Normal 0;σð Þ
The age of the witness variable was mean-centered before fitting the models to
avoid multicollinearity due to the squared term. Comparing these three models
using F-tests shows that M2 explains significantly more variance than M0 and M1
(p<0.001). See Table 2 for details regarding this model comparison. All coefficients
of M2 were significantly different from zero (see Table 3) which supports the
difference in curvature visible in Fig. 1. The models with complexity between M1
and M2 were also compared with M1 using F-tests but none of these tests were
significant.
Using M2, the strength of the prototype effect was calculated as the difference
between the two curves shown in Fig. 2. This difference is shown in Fig. 3, together
with a 95 % bootstrap confidence region (Efron 1979), where a positive difference
implies a positive prototype effect. Taking the 95 % confidence interval as a
measure of accuracy, there is a significant positive prototype effect in the 8–16
age range.
3.7 Discussion
The results of the experiment support the idea that an argument that makes use of a
generalization activates the prototype for the category used in the generalization, to
the effect that the features of the prototype overshadow and partly overwrite the
actual facts of the case. As we have seen, the case will to some extent be judged as if
it had the features of the prototype instead of the features it actually has. This will
enhance the audience’s agreement with the argument in situations where the
audience finds the judgment more warranted for the prototype than for the actual
case (positive prototype effect). But the use of generalizations can backfire. In
Table 2 Comparisons between the three models
Model Adjusted R2 AICc F-test model comparison
F P
M0 – 3243.9 – –
M1 .288 2857.8 469.0 <.001
M2 .299 2843.0 5.73 <.001
The F-tests shown on each row are between the model of the corresponding row and the model corresponding
to the preceding row
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situations where the audience finds the judgment more warranted for the actual case
than for the prototype the activation of the prototype will decrease agreement
(negative prototype effect). In such cases, the argument is more persuasive if the
speaker refrains from the generalization and allows the facts to Bspeak for
themselves^.
As we can see in Fig. 2, the child generalization curve and the control curve cross
each other at approximately 7 years. If our general theory is correct, this suggests
that the prototype child is about 7 years old, as we assumed when we formulated our
predictions for Scenario 1 and 2. According to our theory, summarized in the
hypothesis in Section 2, the audience will agree equally with both versions of the
argument when the judgment for the prototype and the actual case are equally
warranted.
The child generalization curve and the control curve also cross each other at
approximately 17 years. If our general theory is correct, this suggests that the boundary
age for Bchild^ lies somewhere around 17 years, a little higher than we assumed when
we formulated our predictions for Scenario 4, 5 and 6. The use of a generalization will
only result in a positive prototype effect as long as the generalization is applied to a case
that belongs to the category. If it is applied to case that falls outside the category the
audience will react negatively to the inappropriate use of the generalization, as we saw
in Scenario 6 (19 years old).
Table 3 The fitted coefficients of model M2
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5
Estimate 2.8 −1.1 0.37 0.66 −0.26 −0.55
Std. error 0.12 0.091 0.088 0.17 0.13 0.13
P <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.05 <.001
Fig. 3 The mean difference in agreement between the two arguments version estimated by the model M2. A
positive difference implies a positive prototype effect. The grey region shows the 95 % confidence region
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4 Experiment 2—BIntoxicated^
4.1 Participants
Data was collected from the same participants as the first experiment (see Section 3.1),
using Amazon Mechanical Turk. The order of the questions asked in experiment one
and experiment two was randomized for each participant.
4.2 Design
A 6×2 fully factorial design was used. The first factor was the amount of wine
consumed by the witness before he observed a murder (1, 2, 3, 4, 6 or 8 glasses).
The second factor was the version of the argument made by the defense attorney
(intoxication generalization version and control version).
4.3 Material
The experiment was based on a court room scenario with six versions. The six versions
were identical, except for the amount of wine that the witness, Leon Kowalski had
consumed when he made his observations. Each participant was presented with one of
the six versions. The court room scenario read as follows:
BHector Hernandez is standing trial for the murder of Jamal Watts. According to
the prosecutor, Watts was sitting on the front porch of his house at 3.30 in the
afternoon of August 10, 2011 when Hernandez arrived in his car, slowed down
and fired several shots at Watts through the open window. At the trial, the
prosecution calls Leon Kowalski as a witness. Kowalski saw the murder from
across the street. He testifies that he was walking down the street when he noticed
a black sedan coming in his direction. The car slowed down in front of a house
and he saw that the driver lifted a handgun and fired several shots at a man sitting
in front of the house. Then the car took off. Kowalski identifies Hector Hernandez
as the killer. When Kowalski was interrogated by the police right after the murder
a police officer noted that Kowalski’s breath smelled of alcohol. Kowalski
admitted that he had been drinking some wine at a local bar just before the
shooting. Kowalski’s credit card records show that he drank X of red wine.^
Scenario 1 X = Bone glass^
Scenario 2 X = Btwo glasses^
Scenario 3 X = Bthree glasses^
Scenario 4 X = Bfour glasses^
Scenario 5 X = Bsix glasses^
Scenario 6 X = Beight glasses^
Then, the participants were presented with an argument from the defense attorney.
Each scenario had two versions of the defense attorney’s argument, one version
(intoxication generalization) where the argument is based on the generalization Ba
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person who is intoxicated with alcohol is less reliable as a witness^, and one version
(control) that does not use this generalization. In the control version, the phrase
Bintoxicated with alcohol^ is removed, and substituted with exact quantity of wine
stated in the scenario. Each participant was either given the intoxication generalization
version or the control version of the argument.
intoxication generalization BI would like to draw your attention to one important
circumstance with regard to Leon Kowalski’s testimony.
A person who is intoxicated with alcohol is less reliable
as a witness. Leon Kowalski is therefore less reliable as a
witness.^
control BI would like to draw your attention to one important
circumstance with regard to Leon Kowalski’s testimony.
A person who has consumed X of wine is less reliable as a
witness. Leon Kowalski is therefore less reliable as a
witness.^
Scenario 1 X = Bone glass^
Scenario 2 X = Btwo glasses^
Scenario 3 X = Bthree glasses^
Scenario 4 X = Bfour glasses^
Scenario 5 X = Bsix glasses^
Scenario 6 X = Beight glasses^
4.4 Procedure
After reading the given scenario and the given version of the argument the participants
were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the argument on a scale from one
(‘strongly disagree’) to nine (‘strongly agree’).
4.5 Hypotheses
The purpose of the experiment was to investigate the difference in agreement
between the intoxication argument and the control argument, over the six scenar-
ios with the different quantities of wine consumed by the witness. On the basis of
the general theory outlined in Section 2 above our hypotheses for the experiment
were as follows. The participants will find the use of the category Bintoxicated^
appropriate if the quantity of wine consumed by the witness is high enough, and
will find it inappropriate to categorize the witness as Bintoxicated^ if the con-
sumed quantity is below the boundary quantity for intoxication. We predicted that
the participants would react negatively to inappropriate uses, and we therefore
predicted that the participants would agree less with the intoxication argument
than the control argument below the boundary quantity (category transgression
effect). For cases that fall above the boundary quantity a division can be made
between cases where the quantity is lower than the quantity consumed by a
prototypical intoxicated person and cases where the quantity is higher than the
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prototypical quantity. In cases where the quantity is lower than the prototypical
quantity we expected the participants to agree more with the intoxication argument
than the control argument (positive prototype effect). In cases where the quantity
is higher than the prototypical quantity we expected the participants to agree less
with the intoxication argument than the control argument (negative prototype
effect).
These hypotheses are conceptually displayed in Fig. 4, where the partici-
pant’s agreement with the argument is plotted against the quantity of wine
consumed by the witness. It should be noted that the quantity of wine
decreases as we move to the right. The plotted line shows how a decrease
in the consumed quantity of wine makes the argument against the witness less
warranted.
We assumed the boundary quantity to lie between one and two glasses and the
quantity consumed by a prototypical intoxicated person to be about five glasses of
wine. On the basis of these assumptions we made the following predictions for the
six scenarios. In Scenario 1 (one glass) we predicted that the participants would
agree less with the intoxication argument than the control argument (category
transgression effect). In Scenario 2 (two glasses), Scenario 3 (three glasses) and
Scenario 4 (four glasses) we predicted that the participants would agree more with
the intoxication argument than the control argument (positive prototype effect). In
Scenario 5 (six glasses) and Scenario 6 (eight glasses) we predicted that the
participants would agree less with the intoxication argument than the control
argument (negative prototype effect).
Fig. 4 The mean agreement with the argument as a function of the quantity of wine and argument version
(hypotheses)
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4.6 Results
The results of the experiment are summarized in Table 4. To analyze the difference in
agreement between the intoxication generalization argument and the control argument,
a t-test was conducted for each age.
In Scenario 1 (one glass) participants agreed more with the intoxication argument
than the control argument. This was not predicted. In Scenario 2 (two glasses) and
Scenario 3 (three glasses) the participants agreed more with the intoxication argument
than the control argument, as predicted (positive prototype effect). In Scenario 4 (four
glasses) the participants agreed slightly less with the intoxication argument. This was
not predicted. In Scenario 5 (six glasses) the participants agreed slightly more with the
intoxication argument. This was not predicted either. In and Scenario 6 (eight glasses)
the participants agreed less with the intoxication argument, as predicted (negative
prototype effect). As Table 4 shows the results were statistically significant in
Scenario 1 (one glass) and Scenario 2 (two glasses).
A graphic representation of the results is presented in Fig. 5.
4.7 Discussion
Some of the results matched our predictions, and some did not. There was a positive
prototype effect in Scenario 2 and 3, as we predicted, but the graph (Fig. 5) did not
match our hypotheses (Fig. 4) as good as the graph in Experiment 1 (Fig. 2) matched
the hypotheses for that experiment (Fig. 1). At a low quantity of wine (1 glass), there
was no category transgression effect, as we had predicted, and at a high quantity of
wine (8 glasses), the negative prototype effect that we had predicted was small and not
statistically significant. We had expected to see the curves cross each other twice
(Fig. 4), one time at the boundary quantity and one time at the prototype quantity,
but the results showed no boundary quantity cross over (right hand side of the graph),
and the prototype cross over and negative prototype effect (left hand side) was small
and not statistically significant.
An explanation for the lack of a boundary quantity cross over and a category
transgression effect could be that the boundary quantity does not lie between one and
Table 4 Means (and SDs), t-values, and corresponding Cohen’s d for agreement with the intoxication
generalization version and control version of the argument, for different quantities of wine
Quantity of wine Intoxication generalization Control t Cohen’s d
N Mean and SD N Mean and SD
1 glass 111 3.70 (2.37) 89 2.81 (1.73) −3.08** .61
2 glasses 99 4.33 (2.08) 91 3.73 (2.18) −1.97* .40
3 glasses 81 5.37 (2.33) 100 5.19 (2.25) −.53 .11
4 glasses 117 5.96 (2.11) 77 6.03 (2.16) .22 −.05
6 glasses 105 6.38 (1.94) 92 6.26 (2.29) −.39 .08
8 glasses 85 6.66 (2.11) 95 6.97 (1.61) .27 −.23
*p<.05, **p<.01
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two glasses, as we assumed, but is, actually, below one glass. This would explain why
the curves do not cross on the right hand side. To create a situation where the
participants find it inappropriate to categorize Leon Kowalski as intoxicated with
alcohol, you need a scenario where Kowalski has consumed less than one glass of
wine, for example a scenario where he has only consumed a teaspoon of wine. Since
there was no such scenario in our experiment, we missed the boundary transgression
effect.
That the predicted negative prototype effect on the left hand side was small and not
statistically significant can be explained in a similar way. We assumed that the
prototypical quantity consumed by an Bintoxicated^ is around five glasses, but it could
be the case that it is, actually, around seven glasses. This would explain why we did not
see a significant negative prototype effect in Scenario 6 (eight glasses). To see a
significant effect, we should have tested a scenario with a higher quantity, e.g. a
scenario where Kowalski has consumed ten glasses of wine.1
Notwithstanding this incompleteness in Experiment 2, there was a positive prototype
effect in Scenarios 1, 2 and 3, and the effect was statistically significant in Scenario 1
(one glass) and Scenario 2 (two glasses). Experiment 2 therefore lends further support
to our general theory that an argument that makes use of a generalization activates the
1 The absence of a significant negative prototype effect could also be explained in a different way. It could be
the case that Experiment 2 came out differently than Experiment 1 because Bintoxicated^ is a different kind of
concept than Bchild^. It could be the case that a person always comes closer to being typically Bintoxicated^
for every glass that he drinks, no matter how many glasses he has consumed before. In other words, there is no
quantity that exceeds the quantity that first comes to mind when we hear that someone is Bintoxicated with
alcohol^. If this is correct, the prototypical quantity lies at the extreme end of the scale, and there is no quantity
where the generalization is less warranted for the prototype than the actual case. This would explain the
absence of a significant negative prototype effect. With a category like this there can be no negative prototype
effect. An objection against this explanation is that, if it were true, the first thing that would come to mind,
when we hear that someone is Bintoxicated with alcohol^, would be that the person is in a state of delirium,
and this does not seem to be the case.
Fig. 5 The mean agreement with the argument as a function of the quantity of wine and argument version.
The dashed grey lines show the best fitting quadratic curves
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prototype for the category used in the generalization, to the effect that the features of the
prototype overshadow and partly overwrite the actual facts of the case.
5 The Irrationality of the Prototype Effect
The prototype effects that we saw in the experiments can be taken as a sign of irrational
behavior. Let us, for example, look at the positive prototype effect in Experiment 1,
Scenario 3 (12 years old). The participants who were presented with the defense
attorney’s argument in the child generalization version agreed significantly more than
the participants who were presented with the argument in the control version. This
difference in agreement is irrational, as the facts of the case were the same and the
inference was the same. Both groups where given the same scenario, with the same
information about the age of Jessica Miller, and both groups were presented with an
argument from the defense attorney with the inference that Jessica Miller is less reliable
as a witness because of her age. The only difference between the two versions of the
argument was that the control version stated that Ba 12-year-old is less reliable as a
witness^ while the child generalization version stated that Ba child is less reliable as a
witness^.
That a difference in agreement between the control version and the child generali-
zation version is irrational becomes obvious if we imagine a person, X, who is
presented with both versions, and disagrees with the control version but agrees with
the child generalization version. The control version can be represented as a syllogism
with B12-year-old^ as the middle term:
control version
[MAJOR PREMISE] A 12-year-old is less reliable as a witness.
[MINOR PREMISE] Jessica Miller is 12 years old.
[CONCLUSION] Therefore, Jessica Miller is less reliable as a witness.
The syllogism is logically valid according to modus ponens. To disagree with the
argument advanced by the syllogism, X must claim that the major premise or the minor
premise is incorrect. Since the correctness of the minor premise is given X must sustain
that the major premise (Ba 12-year-old is less reliable as a witness^) is incorrect.
Bearing this in mind, let us now look at the child generalization version of the
argument. The child generalization version is a syllogism where Bchild^ serves as the
middle term.
child generalization version
[MAJOR PREMISE] A child is less reliable as a witness.
[MINOR PREMISE] Jessica Miller is a child.
[CONCLUSION] Therefore, Jessica Miller is less reliable as a witness.
To agree with this argument X must claim that the major premise as well as the minor
premise is correct. Since X is committed to the view that it is incorrect that Ba 12-year-old is
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less reliable as a witness^X is forced to interpret themajor premise Ba child is less reliable as
witness^ in a way that excludes 12-year-olds. X must interpret Bchild^ to refer only to
younger individuals, under the age of twelve. However, to maintain the correctness of the
minor premise (BJessica Miller is a child^) X is forced to interpret Bchild^ in the minor
premise to include 12-year-olds, as the given age of Jessica Miller is 12 years. This means
that X assigns onemeaning to the term Bchild^ in themajor premise and a different meaning
to the term Bchild^ in the minor premise. X commits a fallacy of rational thinking known as
the fallacy of equivocation (Mill 1974; Quine 1950). For a syllogism to be logically valid,
the middle term must have the same meaning in both premises. Since X’s agreement with
the child generalization argument is based on a fallacy of equivocation it is not an agreement
in a rational sense. It is the kind of agreement that Arne Naess identified and analyzed as a
pseudo agreement (Naess 1966).
A psychological explanation for why people fall for the fallacy of equivocation has
been offered by John Woods and Douglas Walton. According to Woods and Walton,
people have an innocent desire to interpret premises so that they become acceptable,
and this desire overpowers the ability to notice that the argument slides from one
meaning to another (Woods and Walton 2007).
6 General Discussion
Our experiment shows what can happen when a case is put in a category. The category
brings a certain prototype to mind, and the actual facts of the case are overshadowed by the
prototype. This result is similar to observations that have been made in other studies.
Elizabeth Loftus and John Palmer conducted an experiment where the participants watched
films with car accidents, and where then asked about the incident they had seen (Loftus and
Palmer 1974). Participants who were asked how fast the cars were going when they
Bsmashed^ into each other made a higher speed estimate than participants who were asked
how fast the cars were going when they Bbumped^ into each other. Loftus and Palmer
describe this memory effect as a Bresponse bias^ (Loftus and Palmer 1974, 586), but it could
just as well be explained as a prototype effect. The question BHow fast were the cars going
when they smashed?^ categorizes the case as a Bsmash^ to the effect that the actual speed of
the cars is overshadowed by the prototypical speed of a Bsmash^. The effect has been
replicated in later studies (MacLin 2002).
There is an important difference between the effect that Loftus and Palmer uncov-
ered in their experiment and the effect that we have observed in this study. The effect
studied by Loftus and Palmer is a memory effect. Participants were manipulated in their
memory of an event (the speed of a car). The effect observed in our study is not a
memory effect, as the participants had information about the exact age of the witness
(Experiment 1) and the amount of wine consumed (Experiment 2) right in front of
them, explicitly stated above the question. Our study is concerned with evaluation, not
memory. Participants were manipulated to agree with a certain evaluation (the witness
is not reliable). These effects are useful for different purposes in legal rhetoric. The
memory effect observed by Loftus and Palmer can be used by a skilled litigator in the
questioning of a witness, to manipulate the memory of the witness. The prototype effect
observed in our study can be used by the litigator in his arguments to the jury, to
manipulate the jurors in their evaluation of the evidence. A litigator who seeks to prove
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that a car accident was caused by the defendant’s negligence can categorize the accident
as a Bsmash^ when he asks the witness how fast the defendant was going, to make the
witness Bremember^ the speed as higher than it actually was. A litigator who seeks to
undermine the reliability of a witness can categorize the witness as a Bchild^, to make
the jurors think of her as younger than she actually is when they evaluate her reliability.
This kind of manipulation can lead to incorrect and unjust verdicts. Are such litigation
strategies legal? With regard to the manipulation of witness memory there is a provision in
the Federal Rules of Evidence that prohibits Bleading questions^ (FRE 611c). According to
this rule, a litigator shall not formulate questions to the witness in a way that suggests a
certain answer. This rule can be used by the opposing council to voice an objection against a
litigator who uses a suggestive categorization (BHow fast did the car gowhen it smashed into
the other car?^) If the judge sustains the objection, the litigator will have to reformulate his
question. In contrast to this, there is no procedural rule that prohibits a litigator from using
suggestive categorizations to manipulate the jurors in their evaluation of the evidence. A
litigator is free to use any categorization and generalization that suits his case, and many
litigators do. A litigator is free to categorize a 12 year old as a Bchild^, a person who has
consumed one glass of wine as Bintoxicated^, a person who was caught shoplifting once in
his youth as a Bconvicted felon^, a person who has worked for 6 months as a doctor as an
Bexperienced physician^, and so on.
7 Conclusions
An argument that makes use of a generalization activates the prototype for the category
used in the generalization. We conducted two experiments that investigated how the
activation of the prototype affects the persuasiveness of the argument. The results of the
experiments suggest that the features of the prototype overshadow and partly overwrite
the actual facts of the case. The case is, to some extent, judged as if it had the features of
the prototype instead of the features it actually has. This prototype effect increases the
persuasiveness of the argument in situations if the audience finds the judgment more
warranted for the prototype than for the actual case (positive prototype effect), but
decreases persuasiveness in situations where the audience finds the judgment less
warranted for the prototype than for the actual case (negative prototype effect).
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